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I. Introduction
Aviation is undergoing rapid transformation, with increasing levels of automation and new technology
and operational concepts continually being introduced. A key factor common to all is operational safety.
Safe separation between aircraft has been and continues to be a key driving force in air traffic management
and related research. In today’s airspace, separation is maintained by controllers using generous separation
criteria and by pilots using highly subjective means dependent on visual acuity. While this has proven
sufficient in the past, increasing airspace density and technical innovations are pushing the limits of the
system. Introduction of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) into the airspace would further complicate the
situation because unmanned aircraft cannot “see and avoid” other traffic.
Integration of UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS) therefore requires a robust separation ca-
pability to meet FAA requirement to “see and avoid” and, when passing proximate traffic, to remain “well
clear” as mandated for manned aircraft in 14 CFR §91.113,1 “Rules of the Road”. The Detect-and-Avoid
(DAA) concept was introduced to satisfy this requirement for unmanned aircraft. DAA systems are intended
to enable UAS to remain “well clear” and avoid collisions with other airborne traffic,2–4 and to do so they
require an objective definition of “well clear” (referred to as DAA Well Clear or DWC). DAA is required to
provide detection and guidance to maintain DWC and, where DWC is lost, to provide recovery guidance to
regain it.
DAA systems are envisioned as a means to maintain a low level of risk of Near Mid-Air Collisions6
(NMAC). To accomplish this goal, it is essential to investigate a number of objective definitions of Well
Clear7 and to quantify the levels of risk achieved by proposed DAA concepts. To that end, NASA has
developed a portable software system, Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility and Modeling (JADEM),
that supports various DAA algorithms and can interface with different fast-time and real-time simulation
tools and live systems.8 The target users of JADEM are researchers who need to simulate the main features
of proposed DAA systems before those systems are fully developed by manufacturers. The availability of a
general purpose, flexible, and fast conflict detection and resolution algorithm was critical for the purpose. The
Generic Resolution Advisor and Conflict Evaluator (GRACE)8 proved suitable for that role. In addition to
its core alerting and resolution features, GRACE powers JADEM’s implementation of the recently introduced
bands and well clear recovery guidance concepts (see Ref. 8).
GRACE was used in a number of NASA NAS-wide fast-time simulations, real-time Human-in-the-Loop
(HITL) simulations with participation of experienced UAS pilots and air traffic controllers, and flight tests
with live aircraft.9–18 The complex and rapidly evolving requirements of these studies demanded and created
ample opportunities for extensive evaluation of GRACE in a broad range of operational scenarios and
applications.
The goal of this paper is to describe GRACE with sufficient algorithmic detail to be of interest to
researchers involved in air traffic simulations and to developers of practical DAA systems for manufacture
and deployment. The next section provides an overview of previous work related to development of conflict
detection and resolution algorithms. Section III describes GRACE features and algorithmic details. Section
IV provides sample results of GRACE evaluation. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section V.
II. Background
A number of conflict detection and resolution algorithms have been proposed and actively used for
decades for various research projects (see Ref. 4, 19 and the references therein). Several such algorithms
were inspired by the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)20 that has been very successful
in preventing mid-air collisions for manned aircraft. These systems rely on the cooperative behavior of
aircraft, which actively communicate their state and intent data,21,22 hence said systems cannot be used
with non-cooperative aircraft.
Some algorithms were specifically designed for certain types of onboard sensors, such as radars21 or
optical sensors.23 Other algorithms, such as Jointly Optimal Collision Avoidance, are in principle sensor-
agnostic,24 but are tuned for a specific aircraft response model. Another next-generation algorithm, the
Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), proposed to replace TCAS,25 is more flexible and can be
adapted to different aircraft, including UAS, by updating the probabilistic lookup table driving the ACAS
threat logic. However, these algorithms do not use separation standards that would be needed to maintain
Well Clear as defined by RTCA Special Committee 228.8 Note that DAA support is currently being added
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to ACAS-Xu (the version of ACAS supporting UAS).
Other algorithms, more suitable for Separation Assurance in Air Traffic Control, include the Profile Selec-
tor En Route (PFS-E) component of the Center / TRACON Automation System,26 the Advanced Airspace
Concept Autoresolver, and the Tactical Separation-Assured Flight Environment (TSAFE).27 However for
use in DAA, these algorithms would require non-trivial modifications to accommodate smaller look-ahead
times and spatial separation standards, introduction of temporal separation, the lack of trajectory intent
information, and more frequent update rates.
More recent algorithms, “inspired by nature,” include “force field” methods,28–30 the closely related “light
propagation” model,31 and “navigation function-based” algorithms that model aircraft as particles moving
in a potential field formed by other aircraft with the same “charge” and hence generating a “repulsive
force.”32,33 These algorithms demonstrated their effectiveness in guaranteed collision avoidance, but they
can lead to overcosts and large deviations from nominal routes.35
A number of algorithms are based on optimization methods, which provide a very general framework
for non-linear systems (see Ref. 4 and references therein). These methods typically use a mathematically
rigorous Hamilton-Jacobi approach or heuristic optimization algorithms, such as simulated annealing34 or
genetic algorithms.35 These methods are efficient enough for strategic flight planning, but they are still not
sufficiently fast for real-time applications that require update rates on the order of one second. Another
drawback of these methods is that they model smooth trajectories suitable for future Flight Management
System abilities, which are not (currently) practical for use in UAS DAA systems.
The Generic Resolution Advisor and Conflict Evaluator (GRACE), the subject of this paper, was inspired
by the ideas of force field28–30 and complexity theory,36 and it leverages the computational efficiency of
grid-based methods.37,38 GRACE provides the benefits of flexibility, robustness, and good computational
performance, which make it more suitable for evolving requirements of research and modeling of future DAA
systems. It was therefore adopted in 2013 to provide the core alerting and guidance functions of NASA’s
Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility and Modeling (JADEM).8
It should be noted that JADEM was expressly designed to evaluate DAA concepts using different algo-
rithms. For example, the Detect-and-Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS),39 released
to open source in 2015, is being integrated into JADEM as an alternate alerting and guidance module.
III. Generic Resolution Advisor and Conflict Evaluator (GRACE)
As implemented in JADEM, GRACE is an aircraft-centric algorithm that works to predict and prevent
collision threats to a single unmanned aircraft (the “ownship”) from all other aircraft (“intruders”).
Using the taxonomy defined in Ref. 19, GRACE can be characterized as:
Dimensions: Horizontal and Vertical planes (3D)
Detection: Explicit conflict detection threshold (but user-defined)
Resolution: Optimized
Maneuvers: Turns, Vertical maneuvers, and Speed changes
Multiple: Global
GRACE is a combination of two loosely coupled algorithms. The Generic Conflict Evaluator (GCE)
provides a customizable implementation of conflict detection functionality. The Generic Resolution Advisor
(GRA) is a fast general purpose conflict resolver.
GRACE does not make any assumptions regarding temporal or spatial scales, performance capabilities
of aircraft, or its sensor and communication systems. This flexibility is achieved by using customizable sepa-
ration standards in GCE and a cost function in GRA, and by reliance on an external trajectory predictor for
aircraft flight modeling.8 In particular, this allows GRACE to be used for rotorcraft or other unconventional
UAS.
III.A. Generic Conflict Evaluator (GCE)
GCE is an efficient deterministic algorithm for assessing intruder threats based on user-defined “separation
standards” specified by logical conditions that can include almost any combination of the following (along
with corresponding thresholds and filtering conditions):8,40
• horizontal separation;
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• vertical separation;
• tau-separation based on “simple tau” or “modified tau”;
• horizontal miss distance;
• time to Closest Point of Approach (CPA);
• time to first loss (violation) of separation.
In this paper, the term “violation” (of separation) will be used to indicate that a logical condition that
defines a separation standard is violated.
GCE can support several different “levels” of threat detection, each level being defined by its own user-
specified separation standard. For instance, a separation standard for the highest severity threat can be set
to NMAC as defined in TCAS (500× 100 ft).
III.A.1. Dynamic Grid Mapping and Threat Detection
GCE can be used in two different roles:
1. as initial conflict detection to find the threats that may require resolution; in this role it is called once
for each call to GRACE;
2. in GRA to assess whether candidate maneuvers will result in a conflict-free trajectory; in this role
GCE can be called many times (once per candidate maneuver); for this reason, its computational
performance is critical.
GCE computation time is essentially linear with the number of intruders. Therefore a key performance
challenge is to efficiently identify aircraft that can potentially create threats prior to making any geometrical
computations, which can be time-consuming. This needs to be done for arbitrary aircraft positions, which
can deviate from the nominal route (based on intent) or from previously proposed resolutions.
GCE uses a fast algorithm that avoids distance calculations. The algorithm is based on an airspace
model consisting of identical discrete elements, or cells (the model is referred to as the “grid map”). The
grid map provides a quick way to find intruders close to any arbitrary ownship state by “mapping” all
intruder trajectories predicted within a specified “look-ahead time” to a sequence of 2D grids, one grid per
each time step.8 This can be seen as a deterministic variant of the method proposed in Ref. 37.
The GCE algorithm involves three main operations:
1. Predicting intruder trajectories at discrete time steps up to a specified look-ahead time.
2. Mapping intruders by locating them in grid cells using simple comparisons between the intruder co-
ordinates and cell boundaries. Note that the grid map is stored efficiently as a time sequence of hash
maps populated only with “occupied” cells.
3. Detecting threats from mapped intruders. This uses simple comparisons between cell boundaries and
a bounding box with a side 2δ around the ownship’s position to identify potential intruders, where
δ is a horizontal distance deduced from the separation standards (Fig. 1). Intruders found within
this bounding box are passed to the state-based threat detection logic, which uses specified separation
standards to evaluate threats. A threat is considered “detected” if it is found to violate separation
standards at least at one timestep.
If more than one threat is “detected”, GCE returns the first threat with the earliest conflict start time,
which is defined as the time of the first state that violated the separation standard.
Note that the first operation, which is expensive, is only done once, the resulting grid mapping subse-
quently being used in conflict resolution. This dramatically reduces GRACE computation time.
III.B. Generic Resolution Advisor
The Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA) is the conflict resolution component of GRACE. It relies on the
output from GCE (including the highest priority declared threat and mapping intruders to grid cells). The
main output of GRA is a resolution that includes a recommended avoidance maneuver and a corresponding
ownship predicted trajectory.
GRA uses fast analytical transformations of linearized ownship trajectories before calling GCE for rig-
orous re-evaluation of candidate resolutions. It relies on user-defined cost functions for selecting the best
maneuver. This promotes high computational efficiency without sacrificing flexibility or quality of proposed
resolutions.
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Figure 1. Grid-based threat detection
III.B.1. GRA Algorithm at a Glance
GRA obtains a resolution by trying to find a simple Standard Maneuver that would result in a conflict-free
solution.
The following six Standard Maneuvers (in the remainder of the paper we refer to them simply as “ma-
neuvers”) can be used:
1. Turn Right;
2. Turn Left;
3. Vertical Up: increased vertical speed / flight path angle (faster climb or slower descent);
4. Vertical Down: reduced vertical speed / flight path angle (slower climb or faster descent);
5. Speed Down (decelerate);
6. Speed Up (accelerate).
Finding the best maneuver starts from a local transformation of the CPA, for the highest priority threat,
into a Trajectory Change Point (TCP) such that it satisfies the following conditions:
1. it should not violate any separation criteria;
2. it should constitute a CPA for the transformed trajectory.
The first condition is self-explanatory. The second condition is needed to ensure that after passing the
TCP an aircraft could return to its initial route without the risk of encountering the same threat. This is
important to improve the stability of proposed resolutions and to help pilots determine when they can safely
execute a “recapture” maneuver returning to mission flight plan. Effectively, the TCP defines the end of
maneuver in GRA.
GRA starts by finding a linear trajectory calculated by extrapolating the state at CPA backwards to the
desired start time (see section III.B.2 for details). Each of maneuvers listed above is applied in user-defined
increments (steps), such as 5 degrees for heading change and 1 degree for change in flight path angle. At
every step:
1. a new TCP is obtained by perturbing the linearized trajectory in the direction dictated by the applied
maneuver and analytically estimating the CPA along the new trajectory;
2. the candidate TCP is evaluated to determine whether it is “locally conflict-free” (i.e. does not violate
separation criteria);
3. if the answer is “yes”, a candidate solution is re-evaluated by calling GCE, which checks for conflicts
with all intruders in grid map to verify that the solution is “globally conflict-free” within the specified
lookahead time; this involves generating a new ownship trajectory with the TCP added as a new
constraint;
4. if re-evaluation did not confirm that the solution is “globally conflict-free”, these operations are re-
peated, in the next step, for the same maneuver until the predefined limit in change of control variable
(heading, flight path angle, or speed) is reached.
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If the new solution is “better” than the previous “best” candidate, it replaces it as the new “best”.
Note that first two operations use fast analytic calculations. The third operation takes advantage of
GCE optimization provided by grid map, but still requires computationally intensive calls to Trajectory
Predictor for generating a new ownship trajectory. However these calls are made typically only once for each
maneuver rather than at every step, because in most cases reevaluation confirms that solution is conflict-free
and immediately terminates iterations. This helps greatly reduce computation time.
This sequence of operations is shown in Fig. 2, which is further clarified in the remainder of this section.
Figure 2. Generic Resolution Advisor algorithm
III.B.2. Fast Linearized Analytic Solution for Finding TCP
If a CPA for the original ownship trajectory (black solid curve in Fig. 3) and a predicted intruder
trajectory (red curve) is known from the output of GCE, then the CPA for any perturbed ownship trajectory
(blue curve) can be quickly estimated from an analytical solution based on linearization of predicted ownship
and intruder trajectories near the CPA as illustrated in Fig. 3.
As a first step, the states of ownship and intruder at CPA (shown as arrows) are extrapolated backward
to a maneuver start time that may include an anticipated delay in maneuver execution (referred to herein
as “algorithm delay”), as shown by dashed black and red lines, respectively. This approximation is justified
because the accurate representation of trajectory around a CPA is most important for evaluation of candidate
resolutions. It also simplifies modeling of manuevers by applying them to the extrapolated ownship state
rather than to its actual initial state. Therefore, the perturbed ownship trajectory is approximated by a
straight line, shown as a dashed blue line in Fig. 3. Then, a candidate TCP can be defined as the CPA
for the perturbed trajectory, shown as an arrow on the blue line. Note that this approach is based on the
predicted trajectories from GCE, therefore it does not require any assumptions regarding the availability of
intent data for ownship and intruders.
The CPA is found from the time to minimal distance between ownship and intruder positions on their
linearized trajectories tCPA, assuming that they are moving with constant speeds (see Ref. 8)
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Figure 3. Linearization of the ownship and intruder trajectories near TCP
tCPA = max
{
0,−
∑
k ∆xk∆vk∑
k (∆vk)2)
}
(1)
where k represents a cartesian component and the summation occurs over all three components, with
∆xk = (xI − xO)k, ∆vk = (vI − vO)k - intruder’s coordinates and velocities relative to ownship,
(xO)k, (xI)k - initial ownship’s and intruder’s positions,
(vO)k, (vI)k - ownship’s and intruder’s velocities.
Although the Eq. 1 for time-to-CPA is the same as in Ref. 40, it uses positions and velocities from
the states extrapolated backward from CPA for original trajectories predicted by GCE and not from the
observed initial states. This ensures more accurate TCP if a CPA for perturbed trajectory does not deviate
too much from the original CPA.
III.B.3. Fast CPA Evaluation Using State-based Threat Detector
To determine whether a candidate solution is “locally conflict-free”, the horizontal and vertical separations
at CPA are checked against their threshold values for corresponding separation standard.
These separations can be easily found from ownship and intruder positions at CPA given by:
(xO)k + (vO)k · tCPA (2)
(xI)k + (vI)k · tCPA (3)
III.B.4. Re-evaluation of Solutions
Once a fast check has determined that a solution is “locally conflict-free,” quick evaluation is repeated
at the next step to account for possible uncertainty. If the solution is still conflict-free or a limit of control
variable (e.g. heading or flight path angle) is reached, the solution is re-evaluated using a trajectory predictor
of sufficient fidelity to account for aircraft performance and to check for conflicts with other intruders. This
step involves recalculation of the ownship’s predicted trajectory starting with actual rather than extrapolated
initial state and using constraints modified by adding the new TCP. This trajectory then is rigorously
evaluated for conflicts with all intruders as described in section III.A. Note that intruder trajectories do not
need to be re-calculated since they are not perturbed.
III.B.5. Limits of Control Variables
GRA provides configurable “operational limits” of control variables for maneuvers. For instance, users
can limit the maximum heading change for turns by 90 degrees, and the maximum change in flight path
angle for vertical maneuvers by 5 degrees.
In addition to operational limits, GRA estimates “dynamic limits” of control variables, based on aircraft
performance.
GRA stops incrementing the control variable for each maneuver if it reaches either its dynamic or oper-
ational limit.
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III.B.6. Selection of Resolution
GRA can run in two user configurable “control modes”. In the so called “UseFirst” control mode, GRA
returns the first conflict-free solution it finds. In this case GRA works faster, guarantees that it will find
a conflict-free solution if it exists, and provides solutions that are almost always stable but not necessarily
optimal.
On the other hand, if a conflict-free resolution does not exist, or if GRA is configured for the so called
“UseBest” control mode, GRA will find the best resolution using the following rules:
1. if the best solution was not defined yet, the first candidate solution becomes the best solution;
2. if a candidate solution is conflict-free and the old best solution is not conflict-free, the candidate solution
becomes the new best solution;
3. if a candidate solution and the old best solution are both conflict-free or both not conflict-free, and
the cost of candidate solution is lower than the cost of the old best solution, the candidate solution
becomes the new best solution;
4. in all other cases the best solution does not change.
Note that, even though a TCP estimated from linearized trajectories is approximate, a candidate resolu-
tion is always based on the predicted ownship trajectory, generated using all known information about the
ownship flight constraints (including the TCP) and aircraft performance.
GRA can use any externally defined cost function to select the best resolution maneuver. The cost
function can rank maneuver types by an order of preference (e.g. to support right of way rules) and penalize
or suppress specific maneuver types, too aggressive maneuvers, too frequent maneuver type changes within
an encounter, and maneuvers that would result in too small separation at predicted CPA.8
IV. Evaluation of GRACE Performance
The most obvious potential uses of GRACE are as a fast conflict detection algorithm (GCE), as an
automatic guidance algorithm for UAS (GRA), or as a model of such guidance in simulations of UAS.
GRACE provided the core algorithms for JADEM’s alerting and guidance tools that have been evaluated
and refined in a number of HITL studies and flight tests.8 In all these studies GRACE was used to provide
alerting to pilots. GRACE was also used to provide directive guidance in earlier studies and was used to
compute bands and recovery guidance for the most recent studies.
GRACE also has been used for modeling UAS DAA systems in a number of parametric/factorial stud-
ies41,42 and NAS-wide simulations.13,43,44
This section describes the methodology and sample results of such studies obtained using two approaches,
1. Parametric: uses 180 encounter geometries to test the performance of the algorithm under demanding
conditions regardless of likelihood of occurrence in real life.
2. NAS-wide: uses projected UAS mission profiles developed under prior work45 and recorded VFR traffic
data46 for a more realistic encounter model.
Three different scenario configurations were used in the parametric evaluation, namely,
1. Baseline: uses “perfect” surveillance data without simulated sensor errors and executes GRACE resolu-
tion maneuvers immediately; the mission profile is recaptured at GRACE recommended times following
each maneuver;
2. Noisy Surveillance: similar to the baseline case but uses airborne radar model paired with a tracker;8
this approximates a real-world fully automated concept;
3. Pilot Delay : similar to the baseline case but uses a model of pilot delayed action; this essentially
represents a pilot-in-the-loop concept of operation.
In contrast, a single configuration was used for the NAS-wide case with “perfect” surveillance data,
automatic execution of resolution maneuvers, and mission recapture with no delays.
The remainder of this section provides a summary of the metrics used in evaluations of GRACE perfor-
mance, followed by results for the parametric and then for the NAS-wide evaluation.
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IV.A. Performance Metrics
JADEM fast-time simulator calculates a number of metrics that can be used to evaluate system perfor-
mance. The metrics most relevant to GRACE are listed below.
Conflicts number of conflicts (encounters)
Resolutions total number of resolutions proposed by GRE
Changes Per
Encounter
number of changes in resolution type, such as a right turn followed by a
left turn or by a vertical maneuver, divided by the number of encounters
(conflicts)
Predicted Violations number of times when GRE predicted a violation for any separation
standard within a specified look-ahead time
Actual Violations number of times when GRE detected a violation; this indicates that an
avoidance maneuver failed to resolve a conflict
Failure Rate a ratio of number of failures to resolve a conflict to number of detected
conflicts in %
Predicted NMAC number of times when GRE predicted a NMAC within a specified look-
ahead time
Actual NMAC number of times when GRE detected an NMAC; this indicates a failure
of DAA system to prevent an imminent NMAC
SNMAC SNMAC = max(RNMACRCPA ,
ZNMAC
ZCPA
) × 100, where S is a simple measure of
severity, R is the range, and Z is the vertical separation. SNMAC exceeds
100% in the case of an Actual NMAC, and lower values of SNMAC
correspond to larger separations at CPA relative to the NMAC zone.
IV.B. Parametric Evaluation of GRACE Performance
GRACE performance was evaluated for perfect and noisy non-cooperative sensors with 8nmi detection
range.8 A theoretical omnidirectional sensor was used to study the effect of pilot delay on the performance
of GRACE, while onboard radar and tracker models were used to evaluate the effect of noise.
All test cases in this sub-section were generated for a 50-minute ownship flight following a multi-turn
mission plan typically used in the HITL simulations described in Ref. 8.
Intruders cross the ownship’s trajectory at five different points, which may occur before, after, or within
turns. Encounters are created at each of these points for four headings, three ground speeds, and three
vertical speeds (level, climb, descent) for a total of 180 encounters, all of which are designed to result in
NMAC. Each of these encounters was processed separately and independently from others, and a summary
of statistics for all encounters was generated. This is equivalent to repeating the same ownship flight for 180
different intruders.
GRACE was configured to provide guidance for preventing violation (loss of DAA Well Clear) with
0.66nmi miss distance threshold, 450ft vertical separation threshold, and 35sec modified tau threshold with
tau computed using 0.66nmi distance modifier.7,8 If loss of Well Clear could not be prevented, GRACE
works to avoid NMAC and maximize separation at CPA. In all these tests GRACE is called every second
with two minutes prediction horizon (look-ahead time), which is typical for DAA applications.
Table 1 summarizes the results for three sensor models, namely,
1. Omnidrectional: a theoretical perfect sensor that can detect all intruders within a geometric cylinder
with a range of 8 nmi , a height of ±5000 ft ;
2. Directional Perfect: a tracker and sensor model of airborne radar,8 using truth ownship and intruder
states without sensor noise and navigation errors;
3. Directional Noisy: the same directional tracker and sensor model of airborne radar, which uses per-
turbed ownship and intruder states with added sensor noise and navigation errors.
With unlimited look-ahead time and sensor Field-of-Regard, any algorithm can be reasonably expected
to avoid all violations of DWC. Table 1 demonstrates that with an 8nmi sensor range and a 2min look-ahead
time, GRACE was still able to prevent most violations. Moreover, GRACE avoided NMAC in all cases when
Well Clear violations could not be prevented. Note that, in the table, the number of predicted violations
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exceeds the number of encounters for two reasons: first, return to mission plan may generate a secondary
conflict, and second, for the directional cases, multiple resolutions may be commanded for each encounter
(this is particularly evident for the noisy case).
Table 1. GRACE performance in simulated encounters using different sensors
Sensor Predicted
Violations
Predicted
NMAC
Changes per
Encounter
Actual
Violations
Failure
Rate (%)
SNMAC (%)
Mean Max
Omnidirectional 209 174 0.056 1 0.6 15 15
Directional perfect 246 149 0.006 9 5.1 34.3 39.5
Directional noisy 380 4 1.11 13 7.3 31.8 46.8
In the omnidirectional sensor case, only one conflict was not resolved. Analysis of this conflict showed
that it was an artifact of JADEM recapture logic combined with a mismatch in handling turns. JADEM’s
flight simulator always executes turns in flyover mode (i.e. after crossing a waypoint), whereas GRACE was
configured in this study to use flyby mode. This discrepancy induced a secondary conflict on recapture after
the primary conflict was successfully resolved. In essence, this is a problem that needs to be addressed in
JADEM.
The failure rate appears significantly higher in the case of directional perfect and noisy sensors. Closer
examination revealed that all these failures could be attributed to late surveillance detections with intruders
being detected when they already violated Well Clear. Moreover, in all these cases the detected trajectories
were already diverging after they passed CPA, so no maneuvers were needed to improve the situation. These
late detections are an artifact of sensor performance, which was not a focus of this study. For both perfect
and noisy sensors GRACE was able to resolve all conflicts that were not detected too late. The number of
changed resolutions per encounter for perfect sensors was very low (less than 0.06). For noisy sensors the
number of changed resolutions per encounter increased to 1.1, which is attributed to large vertical errors of
non-cooperative radar sensor.
For concepts that require a pilot to evaluate and execute DAA guidance, a delay is incurred before the
maneuver is finally flown by the UAS control system. DAA algorithms should ensure that recommended
maneuvers remain valid at that time. GRACE allows for delayed response by introducing a delay parameter
(the aforementioned algorithm delay) and computing guidance starting at a point on ownship’s trajectory
corresponding to this delay (keeping the intervening segment “frozen” as it were; see section III.B.2).
It should be noted, however, that pilot response delays are not known in advance and vary from one pilot
to another and from one encounter to another. Therefore, it is important to know how sensitive GRACE
performance is to a mismatch between algorithm delay and actual response time.
Table 2 illustrates the effect of algorithm delays when the total pilot response time is 10 seconds. These
delays are chosen based on results of previous HITL studies. For all algorithm delays varying between 5 and
15 seconds GRACE resolutions avoided all NMACs and prevented almost all Well Clear violations.
Table 2. GRACE performance with pilots in the loop for 10-second total response time
Algorithm
Delay
Predicted
Violations
Predicted
NMAC
Changes per
Encounter
Actual
Violations
Failure
Rate (%)
SNMAC (%)
Mean Max
5 seconds 2349 1849 0.73 3 1.7 13.4 13.8
10 seconds 2346 1849 0.64 0 0 – –
15 seconds 2316 1849 0.60 1 0.6 15.6 15.6
Table 3 illustrates the effect of pilot response time given a conservative 15-second algorithm delay. For
all pilot delays GRACE ensured that all NMACs could be avoided with comfortable safety margin (SNMAC
below 20%). The number of encounters that resulted in Well Clear violations increased with pilot delays
as expected, but remained below 4% of total number of encounters even for total pilot delay as high as 20
seconds. The number of changed resolutions per encounter was below 1.3 for all combinations of algorithm
and pilot delays.
These results clearly indicate that GRACE remains robust even when pilot delays are large and differ
from delays anticipated by the algorithm.
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Table 3. GRACE performance with pilots in the loop for 15-second algorithm delay
Total Pilot
Delay
Predicted
Violations
Predicted
NMAC
Changes per
Encounter
Actual
Violations
Failure
Rate (%)
SNMAC (%)
Mean Max
10 seconds 2316 1849 0.64 1 0.6 15.6 15.6
15 seconds 3419 2636 1.00 6 3.3 8 12.5
20 seconds 4686 3463 1.27 7 3.9 9.9 14.7
IV.C. Effectiveness in NAS-wide Mitigated Studies
The effectiveness of GRACE in mitigating collision threats was validated in a 24-hour NAS-wide fast-time
study of simulated UAS traffic and recorded radar Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic. Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) traffic was not included, since separation of IFR traffic will presumably be maintained by Air Traffic
Control. Eighteen UAS mission profiles developed under prior work were used in this study to simulate a
variety of UAS aircraft conducting an assortment of possible future UAS missions, including: point-to-point
transport, regional mapping/monitoring, and patrol.13,45 The 24-hour scenario included more than 17,000
UAS flights with about 10,000 total flight hours, mostly in transitional class E airspace in proximity to VFR
traffic.45 It was assumed that all unmanned aircraft were equipped with cooperative ADS-B and MODE-C
sensors and a non-cooperative directional sensor with 8-nmi range typical for onboard radars. VFR traffic
was modeled as a mix of flights with and without cooperative sensors. The study leveraged JADEM’s
NAS-wide simulation capability and used a kinematic performance model for flying UAS missions (honoring
commanded resolutions) and for evaluating resolution candidates in GRACE. UAS-to-UAS encounters were
not considered in this study, and algorithm performance was evaluated in aggregate over all airspaces. Note
that, while the study used perfect surveillance sensors, the VFR data is itself inherently noisy.
The study compares two simulations: “unmitigated” and “mitigated.” The unmitigated simulation,
for which GRACE resolutions are neither commanded nor executed, represents the baseline scenario for
UAS without active DAA systems. In contrast, the mitigated simulation commands and executes GRACE
resolutions. Moreover, JADEM’s flight simulator “recaptures” the UAS nominal flight plan after successful
avoidance maneuvers. This recapture can in turn result in secondary conflicts.
This study did not model communication failures, latency, or delayed pilot responses. Work to include
more realistic models of pilot behavior with random delays is currently underway.
Table 4 compares the results of the two simulations and shows that mitigation reduced the number of
predicted violations by a factor of eight and the number of actual violations by a factor of five. GRACE failed
to prevent actual violations for only 2.5% of conflicts with predicted violations. More importantly, mitigation
reduced the number of predicted NMAC events by a factor of 33, and eliminated all actual NMACs. The
frequency of changed resolutions averaged at the level of 0.4 per encounter.
Changes in resolution types and failures to resolve conflicts can both be attributed to late detections,
with intruders first detected when they are too close to ownship. The situation is further complicated by
unknown intruder intent, with GRACE having to rely on extrapolated (dead-reckoned) intruder trajectories.
Table 4. Effect of mitigation on a full-day simulated UAS traffic over the NAS
Simulation Predicted
Violations
Actual
Violations
Predicted
NMAC
Actual
NMAC
SNMAC (%)
Mean Max
Unmitigated 115409 1894 2220 44 29.4 546.3
Mitigated 14394 359 68 0 20.2 92.2
These results show that GRACE, used as an automatic guidance algorithm, was able to prevent almost
all violations of separation. In cases where this was not possible because of late detection or unexpected
intruder maneuver, GRACE was still able to avoid the NMAC.
V. Conclusions
Safe integration of UAS into the NAS requires development and validation of DAA systems as a means
to comply with the FAA-mandated “see-and-avoid” requirement for human pilots. Despite the diversity of
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algorithms that could potentially provide DAA functions, NASA recognized the need for a fast and flexible
“generic” alerting and resolution algorithm that could help reduce the complexity of DAA system modeling.
To fill that need, the Generic Resolution Advisor and Conflict Evaluator (GRACE) was implemented in
NASA’s Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility and Modeling to provide alerting, directive guidance, trial
planning capabilities, bands, and DWC recovery guidance.
GRACE was designed without any assumptions regarding performance capabilities of an aircraft or
its sensor and communication systems. This made it suitable for various applications and DAA guidance
concepts. In particular, GRACE can be used in prototyping various decision support tools for ground pilots.
Furthermore, GRACE makes no assumptions about degree of autonomy. This allows it to be used in fully
autonomous UAS DAA operations, in remotely piloted unmanned aircraft, and potentially even in manned
flights.
The new algorithm was validated and used in a number of human-in-the-loop experiments, in flight
tests with live aircraft, in parametric studies with diverse encounter geometries, and in full-day NAS-wide
simulations. All these tests demonstrated the ability of GRACE to reduce the frequency and severity of
Losses of Well Clear and to prevent NMAC in interactions with other aircraft flying by VFR.
Current and future work includes using GRACE to improve robustness of DAA resolutions, taking into
account uncertainties of intruder positions and intent.
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